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Abstract—Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) play a
fundamental part on the maritime navigation. Beyond position-
ing, GNSS is key for the operation of multiple interfaces on the
bridge of a ship, compromising the skipper skills to perform
traditional navigation. Jamming attacks have been recognized
as a major vulnerability for GNSS and their proliferation have
raised concerns, given the implication of GNSS into several
safety-critical applications. This work provides an overview on
the jamming threat and the main countermeasures techniques,
especially in the fields of robust signal processing, adaptive
antenna arrays and multi sensor fusion. Moreover, the effects of
a Personal Privacy Device (PPD) on positioning based on conven-
tional methods using GPS L1 is addressed. The experimentation
is conducted on the Baltic Sea, where a civilian maritime jamming
testbed was allocated, as result of the cooperation of DLR with
the German Federal Network Agency.
Index Terms—GNSS, Jamming, Maritime Navigation, Jam-
ming Countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have estab-
lished as the cornerstone for the provision of Positioning,
Navigation and Timing (PNT) data. Prospective applications
of intelligent transportation systems, namely driverless cars,
autonomous shipping or automated landing are reliant on ab-
solute and accurate GNSS based positioning. Besides, there is
an evergrowing dependency on this technology for timing pur-
poses. Critical services, including communications, power grid
distribution, finance or emergency response have highlighted
the important role of satellite technology for precise timing
[1]. Despite providing accurate global positioning and timing
estimates, GNSS performance can be easily disturbed due to
a wide variety of factors, among them natural phenomena
(e.g., ionospheric storms) or signal reflection (e.g., multipath
and non line of sight). More importantly, GNSS is prone to
unintended and malicious radiofrequency interference (RFI)
due to the extremely low power of the signals upon their
reception on the earth [2].
The proliferation of radio threats to GNSS signals has
raised serious concerns on the vulnerability of the navigation
process [3], [4]. In consequence, in 2001 the risks of GPS
disruption were assessed for the U.S. transportation infras-
tructure [5] and, more recently, it was declared as a major
vulnerability of cyber physical systems [6]. Intentional attacks
to GNSS signals have been traditionally divided into jamming
and spoofing. Jamming is the act of intentionally directing
powerful electromagnetic waves toward a victim receiver with
the goal of denying its positioning [7]. Spoofing consists of
the transmission of counterfeit GNSS-like signals, with the
intent to produce a false position within the victim’s receiver
without disrupting GNSS operations [8]–[10].
Although selling and using jamming devices is forbidden
in several countries, among them the United States and
many European countries, the acquisition and ownership of
a jammer might not be illegal. Indeed, the access to jammers
is uncomplicated via several webpages, even at a very low
cost [11]. In [12], [13] a detailed characterization of in-car
jammers is analyzed and categories based on the jammer
signal characteristics are defined as well. There are two distinct
motivations for the use of jamming devices: attacking other
GNSS users to deprive them from navigation guidance, and
protection of one’s privacy. While the first is more concerning,
given the malicious intentionality, the second reason is the
most frequent source of jamming. Personal Privacy Devices
(PPDs) refer to the jamming devices whose aim is to prevent
people and vehicles from being tracked [14], [15].
In the marine case, the use of PPDs is tightly related to
the service denial of Automatic Identification System (AIS).
Introduced by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
in 2004, AIS allows for the exchange of dynamic, static
and voyage related data among vessels via VHF broadcasting
channels [16] and its use is mandatory for all passenger ships
and voyaging ships with 300 or more gross tonnage [17].
Originally intended for improved situation awareness, AIS has
been adopted in a variety of security applications, such as
cargo tracking and fishing fleet monitoring. Thus, the use of
PPDs is generally associated with illegal fishery [18]–[20],
as it might deprive the detection of such actions via AIS
tracking. Similarly, AIS blockage was realized to cloak oil
exports from Iranian tankers [21]. Besides, GNSS jamming
in maritime spaces has been frequently endorsed for military
actions [22]–[24], making evident the need to understand and
countermeasure this radio threat.
While the impact of radio threats has been widely studied
for automotive [25]–[27] and aviation applications [CITES],
only a few authors have addressed the effects on the maritime
scenario. Besides the need for accurate navigation, GNSS
plays a fundamental role on the nominal working of a vessel,
since a large number of systems and functionalities onboard a
vessel, such as the Electronic Chart Display and Information
System (ECDIS), the AIS, and the Automatic Track Control,
just to name a few, are strongly dependent on the provision
of accurate PNT information.
In [28] and [29], an international measurement campaign
studying RFI in the L1/E1 and L5/E5a bands on a container
vessel was performed. This study reports how frequent RFI
events occur, even making the GNSS service unavailable in
some cases. [30] evaluates the jamming impact on the safety
of the maritime navigation and the quality of on-shore services
such as vessel traffic management, conducting a jamming trial
on the East coast of the United Kingdom using a professional
L1 band jammer. The lack of GNSSs triggers numerous
alarms and failures of interfaces (like the ECDIS) on the
bridge of the vessel, causing discomfort to a vessel crew that
additionally needs to face the challenge of quickly reverting to
traditional means of navigation. A prior work of the authors
[31] complements the GNSS information with the integration
of inertial sensors and Doppler Velocity Log (DVL) to provide
accurate navigation solution under the effect of jamming.
This work presents a broad picture on the threat of GNSS
jamming and its implication on the maritime domain. For the
characterization of actual jamming conditions, the German
Federal Network Agency authorized the use of an area in
the Baltic Sea to serve as jamming testbed. The main coun-
termeasure techniques against jamming are reviewed and the
deterioration of the navigation solution is analyzed. Besides,
the importance of detecting the interference attack is discussed
and how the context-awareness can be exploited to mitigate
the impact on the navigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides a brief overview on the main techniques for jamming
detection and mitigation. Section 3 analyzes the effects of
employing a PPD over conventional positioning techniques on
an authorized maritime testbed. Finally, section 4 presents an
outlook of the work and discusses the future lines of work.
II. JAMMING COUNTERMEASURES
In general, one can distinguish three groups of solutions
which can be used for mitigation of GNSS jamming. Firstly,
if available, alternative terrestrial radio navigation systems
are employed to enable a position determination independent
from GNSS. However, after the decommission of LORAN-C
(eLoran) in the US as well as in Europe, no global operational
backup exists anymore. For maritime application, the so-
called R-Mode (R-Ranging) is currently being developed as a
terrestrial backup system. Here, existing signals of opportunity
of globally available maritime infrastructure such as MF radio
beacons and ashore AIS stations will be used as possible
ranging sources [32]. A first experimental testbed for R-Mode
will be established in the R-Mode Baltic project (2017-2020)
in the western part of the Baltic Sea [33]. Within the methods
of the second group the impact of jamming is mitigated inside
the GNSS receiver by robust signal processing techniques and
adaptive antenna arrays. Finally, within the third group the
positioning information from the GNSS receiver is combined
within a multi-sensor fusion scheme with independent onboard
sensors.
A. Robust Signal Processing Techniques
To combat RFI, a classical approach in GNSS receivers is
referred to as Interference Cancellation (IC), which consists
of detecting the interference, estimating its waveform (usually
through a parametric model), and mitigating its effect by
substracting that estimated interference [34]–[36]. In math-
ematical terms, the received sampled signal is modeled as
y[n] = xθ[n]+i[n]+η[n], where xθ[n] is the legitimate signals
from GNSS satellites parameterized through a set of variables
such as time-delay or Doppler-shift that we gather in a vector
θ; i[n] represents the interfering signal; and η[n] is a random
term due to thermal noise.
In IC, the various steps described earlier yield an estimate
iˆ[n] of the RFI, which is used to clean the received signal
such that a new signal is generated
y˜[n] = y[n]− iˆ[n] = xθ[n] + ∆i[n] + η[n] (1)
where ∆i[n] = i[n] − iˆ[n] is the residual RFI estimation
error. The performance of IC methods highly depends on the
quality of the RFI detection (i.e., iˆ[n] 6= 0) and estimation
(i.e., ∆i[n] ≈ 0) steps.
Many standard RFI mitigation techniques fall in the cate-
gory of IC. For instance, adaptive notch filtering [37] estimates
the narrowband frequency of the jamming signal to reconstruct
its waveform and remove it as in (1). Another example of
IC technique is pulse blanking [38], where samples above a
certain threshold γ are considered jammed and thus zeroed.
Then, in (1), the estimated interference is iˆ[n] = y[n] when
|y[n]| ≥ γ and iˆ[n] = 0 otherwise.
It is agreed that these techniques provide remarkable per-
formance under challenging jamming scenarios. However, the
main drawback of IC is its need for detecting and recon-
structing the interference signal. Those steps constitute a point
of failure when they cannot be accomplished properly or
under model mismatch [4]. A more versatile set of techniques
was recently proposed that overcome IC limitations, while
preserving their performance. This family of techniques is
known as Robust Interference Mitigation (RIM) and leverages
the technically sound theory of robust statistics [39], [40] to
develop GNSS receivers that are resilient to jamming signals
and other outliers to the nominal model [41]. At a glance,
RIM methods modify the cross-ambiguity function (CAF)
used in the baseband signal processing of any GNSS receiver
to automatically remove outliers, without the actual need for
detecting and estimating interferences. An important feature
of GNSS signals that is exploited in RIM is that those signals
are buried in noise, therefore any other source raising above
that level would be considered as an outlier. Such modification
of the CAF takes the form of a nonlinear transformation of the
incoming signal y˜[n] = ϕ(y[n]), which is applied before the
CAF is computed. A variety of options exist for ϕ(·) giving
raise to different RIM techniques such as myriad [42], complex
signum [43] or Huber [44] nonlinearities. Additionally, RIM
techniques can also be applied in transformed domains (such
as frequency domain) where certain RFIs are observed as out-
liers above the noise level, and thus can be better counteracted
by RIM [45]. For instance, whereas continuous wave (CW)
signals appear as outliers in the frequency domain, they are
not in the time domain. On the other hand, pulsed interferences
behave on the opposite way. The more general dual-domain
RIM (or DD-RIM) methodology was proposed in [46], where
the consecutive use of RIM in two domains (e.g., time and
frequency) is analyzed.
In summary, RIM is a powerful approach to design inter-
ference mitigation techniques for GNSS receivers, which not
only has been proven to provide enhanced performance with
respect to IC but also simpler tuning.
B. Adaptive Antenna Arrays
One of the most powerful technologies available to tackle
the problem of high number-very strong interference signal
arises from the use of multi-channel systems. Typically a
GNSS receiver is formed of three basic modules: antenna,
analogue signal conditioning hardware or frontend, and a
digital signal processing unit. A multi-channel system expands
this architecture into several identical parallel channels. That
means several antenna elements are put together forming so
called antenna arrays. The antenna array can vary in topology
with the most used ones being: Uniform Linear Array (ULA),
Uniform Rectangular Array (URA) and Uniform Circular
Array (UCA). In addition, other conformal topologies are
appearing to adapt the array to different surfaces and applica-
tions [47]. The use of antenna arrays enables spatial diversity
capabilities. Those capabilities rely on the addition of a new
mathematical dimension, the spatial one. The mathematical
degrees of freedom provided allow the algorithms to mitigate
several strong interference impinging the array from several
directions.
In a multi-channel system, the ability to mitigate interfer-
ences can be broken into two groups, depending at which point
in the processing chain the interference is mitigated. If the
interference is cancelled before the correlation process, the
techniques are referred to as pre-correlation techniques. Pre-
correlation techniques are the most powerful but also the ones
with higher complexity and hence requiring more resources
and processing power. Usually fast real time parallel data
processing is required. The advantage of those techniques
is cancelling strong interferences in the early stage, before
the GNSS signal processing has started. The second group,
post-correlation techniques, influences the processing after the
correlation process is completed. Hence, the post-correlation
techniques can use the knowledge of the desired GNSS signal.
A typical example of these techniques is the beamforming
process, where the digitally constructed antenna array pattern
is oriented towards the desired GNSS signal putting zeros
or nulls in the directions of other non-desired signals. This
method can be a good complement for the pre-correlation tech-
niques, removing residual interferences that were attenuated
before the correlation.
Aiming to obtain an array output signal where the inter-
ference is cancelled out, the elements of the antenna arrays
are weighted optimally. Such optimization problem is gen-
erally derived from the Linear Constraint Minimum Variance
(LCMV) algorithm. Since the navigation signal is buried under
noise, the received energy above the noise level will be the
interference contribution. Hence, the usual goal is to nullify
all signals which exhibit a greater energy than the noise.
In the last years, a tendency towards software defined
radio GNSS receivers has put aside the analogue components;
however, for interference mitigation it is crucial to consider all
the components and take the right design steps. The antenna
array [47], [48] and frontend [49], [50] play a fundamental
role in the performance of many array techniques, not only
interference mitigation, but also others e.g. direction of arrival
estimation. In addition, the number of elements in the array
increases the complexity and cost of the system. Potential solu-
tions to these issues include increasing the degrees of freedom
thanks to more advance interference mitigation techniques that
enable not only spatial diversity but also temporal [50].
C. Multi Sensor Fusion
Another way to mitigate the effects of jamming on the
positioning is to fuse the information of GNSS with other
sensing modalities. Inertial sensors, gyrocompass and the
speed log are generally the sensors to accompany GNSS on the
task of maritime navigation. Estimating the navigation solution
of a multi-sensor system is realized within the framework of
Recursive Bayesian Estimation, with the Kalman Filter (KF)
being the most widely applied technique.
One can distinguish three architectures for GNSS integra-
tion [51]: loosely, tightly and ultra-tightly coupled. In the
loosely coupled scheme the processed position and veloc-
ity solution from the GNSS measurements as well as the
measurements from the Inertial Navigation System (INS) are
used as inputs of the KF where the covariance matrix takes
into account the uncertainity of the derived GNSS navigation
solution. In contrast to this, the tightly coupled scheme uses
the raw GNSS measurements, i.e. pseudoranges and Doppler
measurements. Here, the covariance matrix entries describe the
accuracies of the GNSS observables which can be difficult in
the case of jamming as explained in the next paragraph. The
third architecture, the ultra-tightly coupled scheme, uses an
INS to provide receiver dynamics information which allows
the receiver to track weak signals using long coherent integra-
tion.
Jamming can cause the loss of track of satellites. Therefore,
it is more advantageous to employ a tightly coupled KF which
applies the code and doppler measurements directly in the
measurement model of the filter. In contrast to the loosely
coupled KF, it does not need a snapshot position solution for
each integration step which would require tracking at least four
satellites. On the one hand it necessitates having a model for
the pseudorange variance, on the other hand even a few GNSS
code observations can help in constraining the possible drift
of the position estimation. This is typical for inertial sensors
as was reported in [52].
During jamming attacks, observations from the tracked
satellites have been shown to pose just slightly worsen
stochastic error characteristics [31]. In [53], the dual-frequency
Melbourne-Wu¨bbena combination is applied on GNSS obser-
vations under a controlled laboratory jamming experiment for
the stochastic modelling of the noise levels, deriving variance
models for code measurements. These models BLABLA...
Similarly, adaptive sensor fusion procedures can be integrated
with contextual reasoning about the sensor observations to
relate them with situation elements and domain knowledge
[54]. In general, context is used for several key tasks such as
explaining observations according to the situation, constrain
the processes or refine the estimations [55]. In this case, the
analysis of recorded data can be dealt as a context learning
process [56], [57], providing knowledge useful to describe the
presence of jamming accordingly to areas, routes, etc, which
could be used to reason about particular situations and adapt
the fusion parameters.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MARITIME JAMMING TEST
To enable experimental jamming tests under real life mar-
itime conditions, the German Federal Network Agency al-
located a civilian maritime GNSS jamming testbed in the
Baltic Sea. The test area is located approximately 10 km
north of the Darß Peninsula, as indicated in Fig. 1. A ded-
icated measurement campaign was conducted for two days
in October 2015, covering different test scenarios. For the
sake of evaluation, a three hour-long snippet on 22nd October
2015 (DOY 295, UTC 07:00-10:00) is considered in this
work. Three vessels were involved in the experimentation:
the AARON chartered ship carries the jammer and acts as
attacking vessel, the BALTIC TAUCHER II is a multipurpose
research and diving vessel acting as victim of the radio attack
and the NEUSTRELITZ is a law enforcement vessel. Along
Fig. 1. An overview of the civilian maritime jamming test area 10 km North
of Peninsula Darß (54,5474 N, 12,8154 E). Three vessels were involved,
the BALTIC TAUCHER II (B), the AARON (A) and the law enforcement
vessel NEUSTRELITZ (N). A SAR image shows the position of the ships
participating in the experiment.
the three hours studied, the attacker remains anchored in
the center of the test scenario and the victim ship performs
maneuver trials around the AARON at distance ranging from
40 to 4000 m at a maximum speed of eight knots. Since the
NEUSTRELITZ ship is not under the guidance of any DLR
member, she enters the scene and moves along it at her own
behalf. Equipment-wise, the AARON mounts a PPD jammer
on the monkey deck (WolvesFleet WF-121G, total output
power: 2 W) and geodetic GNSS equipment (navXperience
3G+C antenna and multi-frequency multi-constellation Javad
Delta receiver). The victim vessel is equipped with commercial
GNSS equipment and, tactical-grade inertial sensors (Imar
IMU FCAI), a gyrocompass and DVL (Foruno DS 60).
Fig. 2 (left) and (right) illustrates the spectrogram and the
power spectral density, respectively, of the WF-121G which
is a Class II sweeping a continuous wave signal with an
update rate of approx. 10 µs around the GPS L1 frequency
covering a bandwidth of 17 MHz affecting both GPS L1
and Galileo E1 signal tracking, while GLONASS G1 mainly
remained unaffected. This allowed us to use GLONASS for
the calculation of a Precise Point Positioning (PPP) reference
trajectory using RTKLib software [58] even in the direct
vicinity of the jammer.
Fig. 2. Characterisation of the WF-121G PPD jammer. On the top, spectogram
of the saw-tooth-like chirp signal. On the bottom, power spectral density of
the jammer together with the location of the GNSS signals GPS L1, Galileo
E1 and GLONASS G1.
Along the three hours of evaluation, the jammer is switched
off for five minutes in periods of approximately twenty
minutes, with the intention of studying the time for satellite
acquisition under jamming conditions. Fig. 4 depicts the mean
Fig. 3. Evaluation of the availability and quality of the PNT solution, using a SPP solver on GPS L1 observations. a) Situation depiction of the attacking
and victim vessels along the three hours of evaluation. The blue line corresponds to the navigation solution based on an ordinary method and the red line
corresponds to the positioning estimated using a PPP solution when the SPP is unavailable. b) Number of satellites tracked for GPS on the L1 frequency. c)
Distance from the BALTIC TAUCHER to the attacking vessel. d) Horizontal Positioning Error (HPE) over time.
C/N0 among the tracked satellites over time and it highlights
with on shaded gray the periods in which the jammer is turned
off. One can easily observe the immediate deterioration of
the signal strength as soon as the jammer is active. Unlike
phenomena related to signal reflection, where sudden drops of
C/N0 might occur on single satellite links, jamming can be
easily identified due to the abrupt deterioration on the C/N0
affecting all tracked satellites.
Fig. 4. Average C/N0 along the three hours of evaluation. The PPD jammer
is permanently switched on, except for small periods of around five minutes
– indicated as shaded-gray areas.
Since the vast majority of mass-market GNSS receivers are
single-frequency capable and apply an ordinary Single Point
Positioning (SPP) method to calculate the position, the evalu-
ation of the PNT estimation will only use GPS L1 on a SPP.
Fig. 3 a) depicts the position of the AARON (attacking vessel)
and the maneuvers performed by the BALTIC TAUCHER II
(victim vessel). The blue line indicates the estimated position,
while the red line depicts the positions where the vessel could
not be tracked. The size of the area affected by the radio
attack is massive, despite using a relatively simple PPD as
jammer. However, the unavailability of the PNT service is
not entirely correlated with the closeness to the source of
attack. For instance, shortly after 09:30 a PNT solution can be
obtained roughly 750 m away from the jammer, while around
09:50 a PNT solution cannot be estimated at a 3000 m distance
to the attacker, as can deducted from Fig. 3 c) and d).
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work provides an overview on GNSS jamming attacks
and the growing relevance of radio threats for intelligent
transportation systems. In particular, GNSS plays a major role
in the maritime world, since not only the vessel navigation is
heavily reliant on it, but also a variety of interfaces present
on the skipper bridge. Throughout the last years, it has been
shown that the maritime domain often faces the jamming
menace, either due to military or illegal fishery activities. Thus,
a broad view on the main techniques for jamming detection
and mitigation is presented, highlighting the most advanced
methods related to robust signal processing, antenna array
technology and sensor fusion.
Besides, the effects of a jamming attack over conventional
navigation techniques is addressed on a maritime scenario
where the German authorities allowed DLR to conduct such
an experiment. Three vessels participate on the experiment
conducted on the Baltic Sea, where a moored vessel mounts
a PPD and behaves as attacker and the victim vessel performs
maneuvers in the surroundings of the first. It has been shown
that the jamming influence area surpasses a radius of three
kilometres, although its effect is uneven. Jamming detection
via C/N0 monitoring has been shown to perform reasonably,
as all tracked satellites suffer simultaneously from an abrupt
drop on such parameter, available even in low-cost mass-
markets receivers.
Future lines of work include analyzing the individual per-
formance gain achieved by different jamming mitigation tech-
nologies, i.e., robust signal processing, multi-antenna arrays
and sensor fusion, as well as the combination of them. More-
over, the early detection of a radio attack can be considered a
relevant source of context-inferred knowledge, which is in turn
fundamental for gaining situation awareness. Thus, parameters
of navigation algorithms can be automatically tuned and the
crew of the ship might understand that illegal activities are
being carried out in the vicinity.
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